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Abstract. The paper can be logically divided into two parts. In the first part I 
distinguish two kinds of metaphysics: basic metaphysics, which affects scientific 
theories, and a second kind, which is an effect of interpretations of these theories. I try 
to show the strong mutual relations between metaphysics and science and to point out 
that the basic metaphysics of science is based on realistic assumptions. In the second 
part of my paper I suggest that we should consider the basic metaphysics of science and 
its realistic foundations in order to better understand scientific realism and to properly 
resolve the debate around it. The methodology of Imre Lakatos is applied in the paper. 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years much time and energy has been devoted to the problem of 
how science influences our knowledge of reality. We consider, for example, 
what the General Theory of Relativity (GTR) tells us about space-time and 
its relation to matter; what the same theory tells us about the past, the 
present, the future, and the flow of time; and what quantum mechanics 
reveals to us about the identity and individuation of elementary objects of 
our world. We also ponder on the referents of the theoretical terms featured 
in our theories and the role played by the structures discovered by these 
theories. It is surprising that, at the same time, we pay so little attention to 
the problem of how our conjectures about reality affect science—surprising, 
that is, because our theories are not handed to us from somewhere outside 
in a finite, perfect form and free of any assumptions, but rather the opposite 
is the case: they are created (or discovered) by us as solutions to problems 
which at a given time seem to be crucial to us, being grounded on some 
basic assumptions. Revealing these foundations, no matter how self-evident 
they can seem, can help us to see the limitations of our theories and, 
perhaps, to see also how best to develop them. This effort, therefore, lies at 
the heart of science. Such an analysis can also help us answer some of the 
questions mentioned earlier. While investigations of the consequences of 
some theories and possible additional postulates are logically much easier 
Science, Metaphysics, and Scientific Realism 
to undertake than research on the methods which led to these theories, this 
should not dissuade us from undertaking the latter kind of exploration.
1
 
I do not claim, of course, that the problem is new; indeed, some 
philosophers have already written about how metaphysics can affect 
science.
2
 What I want to do is to strengthen the thesis about the importance 
of metaphysics to science, and to distinguish between metaphysics that 
affects science and metaphysics that is affected by science. First, however, 
some remarks on the metaphysics which interest me seem in order. 
 
2. Metaphysics, but of what sort? 
 
I intend to confine myself to the kind of metaphysics that is interested in the 
physical world and wants to stay in touch with science. I start with a very 
general qualification of metaphysics. Traditionally, we distinguish between 
metaphysics, which is concerned with reality as a whole, and epistemology, 
which is a theory of our knowledge. On the other hand, what dominates 
instead in the philosophy of science is the qualification of metaphysics 
stemming from Hume and Kant, where metaphysics is defined as 
something unempirical. If we accept this feature as an important 
characteristic of metaphysics, together with the first requirement, that 
metaphysics is interested in referring to the physical world, two conditions 
can be used to characterize metaphysical statements. The first condition, 
which I will call P and which is imposed on the statements themselves, 
demands that they should not be empirical and, of course, not analytic:  
 
P A statement is metaphysical P iff (if and only if) it is not empirical 
and not analytic.
3
 
The second condition, which I will call R, requires that statements aspire to 
refer to the physical world (rather than to our knowledge):  
 
R A statement is metaphysical R iff it refers to the physical world.  
 
Sometimes, in speaking about the ontology of some empirical theory,
4
 we 
use statements that satisfy condition R. Condition P was widely exploited 
                                                 
1
 This kind of research has been included in the context of discovery and has been 
qualified as irrational and belonging to the domain of psychology, but it seems rather 
that it is this qualification and the aversion to this kind of research that should be 
explained psychologically. I will not pursue this question. 
2
 See e.g. Popper (1959, 1983), Lakatos (1970, 1971), Watkins (1958, 1975), Agassi 
(1964), Sklar (1981), Redhead (1995), Belot, Earman (1999). Redhead, Belot and 
Earman write about the two-way interactions between metaphysics and science. 
3
 This first condition imposed on metaphysical statements is assumed following 
Watkins (1958, p. 345). I introduced two independent conditions in order to be able to 
distinguish between those statements that satisfy only one of the conditions, and those 
that satisfy both. 
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by logical positivists. It seems, however, that when we consider 
metaphysics, we think mainly about statements that satisfy both of these 
conditions, P and R. Unless indicated otherwise, I use the term 
“metaphysical” in such a sense. What I want to show in the next part of my 
paper is that metaphysical statements understood in this manner are of 
particular importance for empirical sciences.  
Two kinds of metaphysics are closely related to science: basic 
metaphysics, which can affect science, and interpretative metaphysics, 
which may be seen as an effect of the attempts to interpret scientific 
theories. What distinguishes these two kinds of metaphysics is their relation 
to scientific theories and the way their use is justified. The first actually 
affects science—it tries to grasp the general properties of the world, and its 
reliability can be justified on the basis of its fruitfulness for the creation, 
assessment, and development of scientific theories.
5
 The second concerns 
our interpretation of scientific theories and is justified mainly by its 
explanatory worth. This division, of course, is not a dichotomy: statements 
that form the metaphysical basis of some theory can be—and often are—
part of its interpretative metaphysics. The distinction, however, is drawn for 
three reasons. Firstly, a metaphysical interpretation of scientific theories can 
be—and indeed sometimes is—made on the ground of somewhat different 
metaphysical assumptions than those taken for granted in their 
metaphysical basis. Secondly, basic metaphysics refers to a broader class of 
phenomena than interpretative metaphysics does, and can be somehow 
„deeper‟, as in the case of the metaphysical assumption about a uniform 
order of the world. And thirdly, some new basic metaphysical ideas and 
new notions for science might not ever be considered before we actually 
start to look for a new theory. If somebody forgets about the metaphysical 
basis of science, they will only see a one-way impact of science on 
metaphysics.
6
 
 
2.1 BASIC METAPHYSICS 
 
The attitude toward metaphysics and its relation to science in the 20
th
 
century evolved from denying it as meaningless in the early positivist 
“narcotic” conception of metaphysics, to treating it as “influential” by 
Popper, to considering metaphysics as a rightful part of science with 
                                                                                                                 
4
 I treat ontology as a branch of metaphysics which talks about what exists. We can 
speak, for example, about the ontology of a particular theory as the set of things whose 
existence is acknowledged by this theory. 
5
 Such a role of metaphysics was emphasized, for example, by Popper (1983), 
Watkins (1958), Agassi (1964) and Lakatos (1970). 
6
 Such a one-way impact of science on metaphysics is considered, for example, by 
Hawley (2006). 
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Lakatos.
7
 It is just this continual struggle of both logical positivists and their 
critics with the concept of metaphysics that has revealed how metaphysics 
can be interesting and important even for those of us inclined to treat 
scientific methods as the best available for humankind.  
A new attitude toward metaphysics was made possible when Lakatos 
adopted a novel approach to the rationality of science, together with the 
assumption, which seems to be quite natural, that events and factors that 
influence science in a rational way should be included in science and 
treated as internal to it. This criterion for differentiating between internal or 
external factors was complemented by Lakatos with a second meta-
methodological criterion, that of appraisal of methodology. If one 
methodology, involving a certain theory of scientific rationality, allows us 
to treat as internal something that another methodology treats as external, 
then that is an argument for the superiority of the first methodology.
8
 What 
Lakatos showed that is prticularly important for the topic of this paper is 
that scientific research programmes advance not by induction or 
falsification, but as a development of the metaphysical doctrines that 
become part of the hard cores of such programmes.
9
  
It is not hard to find examples of such doctrines. We can point out 
several metaphysical ideas that were born in Greece and should be 
mentioned here because of their importance for science. The whole of 
science can be treated as grounded on two metaphysical assumptions that 
we owe to the Presocratics. The first one speaks of the rationality of the 
world treated as something exterior to and independent of us: there is a 
uniform order in the world that is subject to a principle or law available to 
our understanding.
10
 The second one boils this principle down to numbers. 
Both of these assumptions are necessary for science: only someone who 
believes there is order in the world will look for it and will be able to find 
                                                 
7
 See e.g. Popper (1959, 1983), Lakatos (1970, 1971), Watkins (1958, 1975). A 
substantially longer and somewhat different history of metaphysics in the 20
th
 century 
can be found in Zimmerman (2004, Prologue). 
8
 The meta-methodological criterion was used by Lakatos to show the superiority of 
his own methodology of scientific research programmes over competing methodologies 
(see Lakatos (1971) p. 99; Watkins (1975) p. 94). I am later going to use Lakatos‟ meta-
theoretical criterion to assess different metaphysical views concerning the relations 
between science and reality. 
9
 The title of this section should be read in the spirit of  Lakatos and not Popper; I 
am discussing metaphysics that permanently affects science, and not Popperian (1933-
34) metaphysics, which influenced science only in its infancy. Following Lakatos, we 
can include basic metaphysics (but not always interpretative metaphysics) into scientific 
research programmes. 
10
 This metaphysical assumption seems to be the most fundamental metaphysical 
assumption we take for granted in our cognition, and is also assumed in this paper as a 
primary principle. It might be recalled here that the Greek word “kosmos” means order.  
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regularities. In particular, a numerical order can be found only by somebody 
who is looking for numbers and not only for properties in the world—that 
is, a numerical order can be found only by somebody who is trying to 
describe the world in terms of numbers. And the third metaphysical 
doctrine of great consequence—atomism—has been very influential 
through the centuries. For instance, it made possible the development of the 
corpuscular theory of light, it led Boltzman‟s research into the possible 
reduction of thermodynamics to mechanical laws, it inspired Planck when 
he was looking for a formula for black-body radiation consistent with 
observations, and at present it motivates the attempts to find a quantum 
theory of space-time.
11
 
Even these simple examples of three metaphysical doctrines and their 
history can reveal some important regularities. The Pythagoreans first 
looked to find the rationality of the world in integers, but after the discovery 
of incommensurable magnitudes (irrational numbers, as we call them now) 
they began to see geometrical objects as the fundamental entities of the 
world. This shows that in fact we do not work on one single metaphysical 
assumption, but rather on a set of assumptions that have different levels of 
generality.
12
 In case of difficulties with the realization of a certain 
metaphysical principle, we can refer to a principle at a higher level (e.g., 
about the rationality of the world) either to replace it or to modify the initial 
idea. Greek mathematicians also made an attempt to resolve their problem 
in another way: Eudoxus‟ theory of proportions made it possible to deal 
with incommensurable magnitudes and—as we know at present—it could 
be used to change the concept of number by embracing irrational 
magnitudes within it.
13
 The history of atomism also allows us to see how 
the original metaphysical idea was modified: formulated with success for 
the elementary components of matter, the doctrine was next implemented 
for energy, and is now used in the attempts to formulate a new theory of 
space-time. Such a broadening of the original idea is nothing more than an 
attempt to implement a more general metaphysical idea of the uniformity 
(or simplicity) and rationality of the world.  
                                                 
11
 See e.g. Smolin (2001). 
12
 See e.g. Waerden (1954) for the origins of the Pythagoreans‟ geometric algebra. 
Their conversion from belief in integers to belief in geometric magnitudes also resulted 
in Plato‟s geometry-based metaphysics in the Timaeus. It seems that, contrary to what 
Popper (1952) maintains, Plato was influenced by the Pythagoreans‟ new attitude 
toward geometry rather than the other way round. See Heath (1981, pp. 150-154) and 
Waerden (1954, pp. 125-126) who claim that according to the reliable report of 
Eudemus, it was particularly the Pythagoreans who laid the foundations of geometric 
algebra. 
13
 For similarities and differences between Eudoxus‟ theory of proportions and 
Dedekind‟s theory of cuts see, for example, Bourbaki (1969). 
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Twentieth century physics also shows that metaphysical ideas which are 
not implemented in a physical theory can be used to criticize it and to 
inspire the formulation of a new theory to overcome the shortcomings of 
the first; this, for example, is the case with determinism and quantum 
mechanics.
14
 Such a discussion is possible because we have differing 
metaphysical ideas, such as determinism and indeterminism, atomism and 
the principle of continuity (Leibniz), or the principles of action at a distance 
(Newton) and of action at vanishing distances (Descartes), which are 
incompatible and can therefore be employed to criticize one another. 
It is obvious that metaphysical doctrines do not determine the scientific 
theories we are searching for; what they do is point out general properties of 
the world and of the theories we are looking for. Unlike scientific laws, 
they do not describe particular properties or structures of the world, but 
only inspire us in our research by showing the direction it should take. This 
is why they are not empirical; they are too general to be verified directly 
and can only be evaluated on the basis of their fruitfulness in the 
formulation, assessment, and development of scientific theories. For 
example, metaphysical doctrines can maintain that all there is in the world 
are continuous fields, postulating that every phenomenon should be 
explained in terms of continuous fields (the metaphysical program of 
Faraday, Maxwell and Einstein), but without actually specifying particular 
kinds of fields or their properties (or structure). Success in searching for a 
particular theory does not prove, of course, that our metaphysical doctrine is 
true, but rather that it can be true—after all, our theories are only 
hypotheses and are applicable only to some restricted types of phenomena, 
whereas metaphysical doctrines want to be as universal as possible. 
Similarly, failure in our hunt for a new theory with the required features 
does not prove that our metaphysical assumptions are false, only that our 
search did not succeed (maybe it was not deep enough). Not being provable 
or falsifiable, our metaphysical doctrines are still—or rather, should be—
open to criticism; they can be—and sometimes should be—refuted, 
modified, or simply made more precise. 
Finding a new scientific theory requires not only luck, but first and 
foremost the creativity to make our metaphysical assumptions more precise. 
For instance, if we believe in the rationality of the world, we should decide 
what this rationality consists of: numbers or ideal geometrical constructions 
(e.g., Pythagorean circles and spheres), deterministic or perhaps 
indeterministic laws. If we decide on numbers, we have to decide which 
numbers we want to employ to describe the world. It follows from this, as 
has already been mentioned, that we do not use single, isolated 
                                                 
14
 See e.g. Einstein (1949, pp. 81-89). 
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metaphysical claims, but rather a collection of claims that can form a 
hierarchy. 
Well-known cases of accidental discoveries could be cited to dispute 
such a claim, but I would nevertheless still maintain that our search is 
always driven by some metaphysical assumptions.
15
 Without denying room 
for accidents and simple luck, I would insist that there are no purely 
accidental discoveries—purely, that is, in the sense that such discoveries 
lack metaphysical assumptions. As Kuhn remarked, an unexpected 
discovery—originating from some anomaly—emerges only for the man 
who, “knowing with precision what he should expect, is able to recognize 
that something has gone wrong.”16 It can also be added that such a 
discovery is only possible for the man who believes in the rationality of the 
world—that it is uniform or homogenous, without room for contradictions 
and exceptions from the rules that are available to our cognition, and that 
whatever happens can and should be confronted and explained by our 
knowledge. What distinguishes “accidental” discoveries from “non-
accidental” ones is that the former are based on more general or deeper 
metaphysical assumptions. 
From a philosophical point of view, a fundamental problem is that of 
justifying the methodological rules and values we use in science. There is 
also the essential question concerning the relations, if there are any, 
between these rules and values on the one hand and metaphysical claims on 
the other—for example, between the rule “search for the simplest and most 
general theories” and the metaphysical claim “the organization (or the 
constitution) of the world is simple and homogeneous,” or the rule “look for 
general laws describing the world in numbers” and the claim “the structure 
of the world is based on numbers” (or “numbers are the principle of the 
world”). The scientific status of methodological rules has always seemed 
firm and has never been doubted. Contrary to this, metaphysical statements 
were often treated as non-scientific and were mistrusted. Even Popper, one 
of the co-authors of the new attitude toward metaphysics, in the beginning 
(1933-34) treated metaphysical statements as hypostases of methodological 
rules.
17
However, many of the most important methodological values that 
we impose on our theories and the methodological rules that guide our 
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  See, e.g., Kuhn (1996, pp. 57-58) for the discovery of X-rays by Roentgen. 
16
 Kuhn (1996, p. 64). This way Kuhn tried to resolve the following problem: “why 
normal science, a pursuit not directed to novelties and tending at first to suppress them, 
should nevertheless be so effective in causing them to arise.” 
17
 It is not quite clear how Lakatos saw this problem. In (1970) he repeated after 
Popper that methodological rules are primary and they may be formulated as 
metaphysical principles (1970, pp.  132, 136) while in (1971) he did not derive 
metaphysical principles from methodological rules and seemed to treat them as of equal 
rank. 
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research have their roots in statements that are metaphysical. We can ask: 
why do we appreciate such values as simplicity and generality, depth, 
coherence, richness of content, precision and exactness of predictions, and 
intersubjective validity, and assume methodological rules that demand that 
we search for these values? Why are we still trying to describe the world in 
a language of numbers and causal relations? The answer to these questions 
seems to be simple. We look for some lost object in our home because we 
are convinced that it is there. In the same way, we look for simple and 
general theories with rich content because we are convinced, as were the 
Greeks, that the constitution or structure of the world is simple and uniform, 
and that the theories that we regard as general and “deep” have a chance of 
revealing their fundamental (or deep) structure. We require coherence 
because we believe in the ontological law of contradiction, and demand 
intersubjective validity of our theories because we believe that the world is 
independent of us and the same for all of us. We try to describe the world in 
numbers because we are convinced that its structure is mathematical; we 
appreciate precise and exact predictions and want to see causal relations in 
the world because we do not want to see our world as ruled by accident. In 
all these cases, our metaphysical convictions (i.e., they refer to the world 
and are unempirical because of their generality) are motives or reasons for 
accepting methodological values and rules.
18
 Alternative attempts to answer 
the above questions by pragmatic efficacy do not seem to be attractive. 
They do not explain why we so insistently pursue more and more general 
theories, why we treat simplicity as such an important methodological 
value, and why we think of old theories as false.
19
  
For a philosopher, the difference between epistemological (referring to 
our knowledge) and metaphysical (referring to the world) statements is 
elementary, but, setting this aside, one could maintain that there is no real 
difference between, for instance, the heuristic rule “astronomical models 
describe (or should describe) motions of heavenly bodies as combinations 
of uniform motions in the circular orbits” and the claim “heavenly bodies 
are uniformly moving in circular orbits,” which formed the metaphysical 
program for astronomy from the Pythagoreans until Copernicus, or “our 
fundamental theories are (or should be) as simple and general as possible” 
and “the constitution of the world (or its structure) is simple and 
homogenous.” However, this is not the case. To show this, I could simply 
recall that, for example, astronomers from the Greeks until now have been 
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 My use of the words “motive” and “reason” is not accidental; as noted by 
Watkins (1958, pp. 356-357), there is a logical gap between statements and 
prescriptions illustrated by the fact that someone may reject a certain doctrine in its 
fact-stating form while subscribing to the prescriptive version of it. 
19
 Similar arguments were used by Popper (1983, pp. 113-117) in his critique of 
instrumentalism. 
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trying to describe the motion of celestial bodies treated as real; Newton 
regarded space as a substance; Huygens, Mach, and Einstein wanted to deal 
with spatiotemporal structure as something determined by relations between 
real bodies and so on. Instead, I would like to demonstrate something more, 
that is, that we have to rely in science on metaphysical (P and R) claims.  
The best argument for this viewpoint comes from meta-theoretical 
considerations that are required in science whenever we want to compare or 
to unify two different theories. To show this, I would like to consider the 
following questions: why do we demand, as Einstein did, that different 
theories, for example mechanics and electrodynamics, must have the same 
spatiotemporal symmetries, and, more generally, why do we use the same 
entities with the same properties in different theories? Why do we use the 
same charged particles (e.g., the electrons) in theories of electricity and 
magnetism? Why do the same entities appear in electrodynamics and in the 
theory of weak interactions? Why do we use the same spatiotemporal 
characterizations for certain objects when we describe them in mechanics 
and in electrodynamics, or in mechanics and the theory of gravity? It seems 
that the only plausible answer is that all these theories tell us about the same 
objects or the same structures. In such cases, our judgments are based on 
two assumptions that are metaphysical (P and R): “there are objects—e.g., 
elementary particles—independent of us that form the bases of all physical 
phenomena” and “there is a spatiotemporal structure independent of us that 
forms the physical base—the same for all physical phenomena.”20  
Two essential remarks should be made at this point. Firstly, our 
cognition is aimed, as can be seen in these and other examples, both at 
observable (e.g., heavenly bodies) and unobservable objects (e.g., electrons, 
current density, electromagnetic fields, or space-time structure and its 
symmetries). It is not that we want only to describe and explain the 
behavior of observable objects and indications of measuring instruments 
and therefore we introduce such theoretical entities as, for example, 
electrons, space-time symmetries, and electromagnetic and gravitational 
fields. On the contrary, since the Greeks we have always aimed mainly at 
gaining knowledge of the unobservable constitution of the world, its 
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 Although I am of the opinion that non-eliminative ontological structuralism is the 
best response to Laudan‟s (1981) pessimistic meta-induction, in the very general 
considerations of this paper I do not want to prejudge which form of structural realism 
is best. Similarly, in speaking about the same entities and the same objects, I do not 
want to prejudge what is their nature and which metaphysics of structures should be 
implemented. For a different kind of structuralism see Worral (1989) and Ladyman 
(1998, 2007), and for a critical analysis of structuralism from the realistic point of view 
see Psillos (1995). The argument formulated above in the main text can be seen as a 
reversal of the pessimistic meta-induction, so it could be called the optimistic meta-
abduction. 
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general laws and fundamental principles, as well as its elementary 
components, their properties and interactions. The indications of measuring 
instruments are always for us nothing more than simply means to this end.
21
  
Secondly, much of our research about the world seems to be aimed at its 
various structures. Of course, we want to gain knowledge about the 
components, both elementary and compound, but we are also interested in 
the structure (or constitution) of the world: causal structure, space-time 
structure, the structure of matter distribution, and, perhaps most 
importantly, the structure that we think of when we consider the 
fundamental physical laws and relations between them. Of this last 
structure, we say that the more unified and more general the theories are, 
the simpler and deeper the structure of the world that they reveal. Our 
efforts, which have been continuing ever since the early Greeks, to discover 
the fundamental principle or the fundamental laws of the world considered 
as independent of us are aimed at this very structure and are led by the 
general metaphysical assumption mentioned before: “There is a uniform 
order in the world that is subject to a principle or law available to our 
understanding.” 
I would like to emphasize that I do not claim that we are guided only by 
metaphysical doctrines in our scientific research. I claim, rather, that 
science in principle tries to refer to the world and what we do is make an 
effort to obtain knowledge about it, both in its observable and unobservable 
parts. Of course, we also use heuristic principles and rules, like, for 
example, “our knowledge is uncertain” or “be critical of your knowledge,” 
which are weakly connected with metaphysical doctrines. Again, however, 
even if we consider our knowledge and its properties, a better part of this 
knowledge refers, or at least aspires to refer, to the world and is based on 
metaphysical (P and R) conjectures about this world. 
 
2.2 INTERPRETATIVE METAPHYSICS 
 
I have tried to show that science is aimed at the world and makes an effort 
to acquire knowledge of its observable and unobservable entities, and that 
scientific theories are based on metaphysical assumptions (those which are 
unempirical and refer to the world). Having formulated a scientific theory, 
we can try to interpret it metaphysically and, among other things, check 
whether it really embodies the intended metaphysics. Rather than fully 
discuss the broad subject of interpretative metaphysics, I offer some general 
remarks about it. 
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 This naturally connects with the scientific realism debate. I return to this problem 
below. 
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Historical cases show us that the basic metaphysics is not always, as a 
whole, embodied in the theory. Newton was convinced that space and time 
are absolute in the sense of being independent of physical bodies and in the 
sense of the existence of a distinguished reference frame, and he wanted to 
refer motion in his dynamics to an absolute space understood in the second 
way. As we know at present, only this first metaphysical assumption is 
embodied in his theory. Einstein, on the contrary, was led by his anti-
absolutist metaphysical assumptions while working on GTR. He was 
convinced that if an inertial structure of space-time affects the motion of 
physical bodies, it should be affected by them as well or, in other words, it 
should be a dynamic element of the new theory. He also wanted to embody 
the relational metaphysical ideas expressed by Mach‟s principle into GTR. 
Again, as we know at present, and contrary to Einstein‟s first assessment of 
GTR, only this first metaphysical assumption is included in his theory.
22
  
Such cases, as well as Laudan‟s instances of mistakes in interpretative 
metaphysics consisting in a discontinuity of ontological interpretation of 
scientific theories, or the possibility of different formulations of the same 
theory, show us that we should be cautious and open to criticism when 
doing a metaphysical interpretation of some theory.
23
 But should we, 
completely or partially (regarding theoretical terms), abandon the realistic 
interpretation of scientific theories for this reason? I do not think so. We do 
not claim, after all, that all our metaphysical claims have to be necessarily 
true. Mistakes are quite normal if we take into account the fact that our 
knowledge, metaphysical as well as scientific, is hypothetical in character, 
and it is usually not so difficult to correct such mistakes. In some cases, 
such as Newton‟s assumption about the existence of a distinguished 
reference frame or Einstein‟s conviction about the validity of Mach‟s 
principle, we can simply reject the false assumptions. A more sophisticated 
and more universal resolution of the difficulties mentioned above was 
proposed by Worral (1989), following Poincare. His structural realism boils 
down to the claim that what scientific theories really tell us about the world 
are structural relations between phenomena and not the nature of these 
phenomena. Such a line of attack regarding the problem of metaphysical 
discontinuity seems to be additionally justified by the fact that, as pointed 
out above, an important part of our cognition seems to be aimed at the 
different structures of the world. 
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 See, e.g., Earman (1989). 
23
 Laudan (1989) pointed out that many entities posited by empirically successful 
theories, such as phlogiston, caloric or ether, were abandoned in the history of science. 
We know also many examples of different ways of expressing the same physical 
theory; for example, for Newtonian mechanics we can use a standard formulation (with 
an action at a distance), or the Lagrangian and Hamiltonian approach, or a formulation 
in terms of curved space. See, e.g., Jones (1991). 
Science, Metaphysics, and Scientific Realism 
An alternative approach to the problem of mistakes and difficulties in 
the metaphysical interpretation of scientific theories in the form of a partial 
(with respect to unobservable entities) or complete cutting off of the 
realistic roots of such theories (carried out usually by philosophers) consists 
in trying to interpret them in an anti-realistic way, e.g., instrumentally. Such 
an approach, however, seems to be just as rational as denying science itself 
by virtue of its mistakes, such as the phlogiston theory of combustion or the 
theory of ether. What is more, such an attitude toward science gives us 
much less than it promises. What it really does is produce an exchange of 
metaphysical assumptions. The assumptions about the reference of 
scientific theories and their theoretical terms to the world are substituted by 
other—likewise empirically unjustified—metaphysical (P) claims, such as, 
for example, that scientific theories (or at least their theoretical terms) are 
only instruments for predictions, or that the only aim of scientific theories is 
empirical adequacy and that knowledge of unobservable phenomena is 
impossible.
24
  
I have tried to show that we cannot simply deduce metaphysics from a 
scientific theory: we can interpret it metaphysically only if we assume some 
additional metaphysical (at least in the sense of being metaphysical P) 
assumptions in both the realist and the anti-realist approaches.
25
 In the case 
of the realistic approach, which seems to be more interesting, the more 
extended the metaphysics we desire, the more developed set of 
metaphysical assumptions we need. So, for example, it does not follow 
from scientific realism that this realism must have a structuralist form, it 
does not follow from structural realism either that it must have an ontic or 
an epistemic form, and it does not follow from ontic structural realism that 
it should take an eliminative form (regarding individuals) rather than 
applying a structural theory of identity for individuals.
26
 In a similar way, it 
does not follow from space-time substantivalism whether space-time should 
be identified with a bare differential manifold or maybe with a pair 
consisting of a manifold and a metric tensor, and it does not follow from 
this second option whether we should accept primitive thisness for space-
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 The last two statements are a crude exposition of van Fraassen‟s (1980) 
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 For example, Sklar noticed: “one cannot simply „read off‟ simple metaphysical 
conclusions from the relativistic theory. Rather, the metaphysical stance one ought to 
adopt follows only from the adoption of a number of fundamentally philosophical 
postulates” (1985, p. 289). However, sometimes in his conclusions, he seems to go too 
far: “one can extract only so much metaphysics from a physical theory as one puts in” 
(1985, p. 292). After all, he also claims that some metaphysical options have more 
plausibility than others. I try to show in my paper that we have the methodological 
tools, both in basic and interpretative metaphysics, to compare and assess different 
metaphysical doctrines. 
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 See Ladyman (1998, 2009). 
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time points or rather a structural theory of identity.
27
 In each case, we have 
to make additional metaphysical assumptions to receive the metaphysical 
interpretation of the theory. The explanatory value of such an interpretation 
is the only justification for the theory. 
It should be emphasized that the task of interpretative metaphysics is 
twofold: together with the interpreted scientific theory, of course, it should 
not only describe and explain physical phenomena and in this way provide 
us with the truth about the world, but it should also explain why we 
understand and use this theory in a certain way (or propose an alternative 
way that is equally effective) and why we should treat successive changes 
in a series of theories as rational. Given that we have a metaphysical 
interpretation that satisfies these two conditions better than other 
interpretations, we can treat the former as better—again according to 
Lakatos‟ criterion applied to the interpretative metaphysics in my meta-
theoretical analysis. In this way we can, for example, consider structural 
interpretative metaphysics (or, strictly speaking, the methodology equipped 
with structural interpretative metaphysics) as better than non-structural or 
anti-realistic metaphysics. It is not only compatible with the earlier 
mentioned aim of science, which at least partially consists in getting 
knowledge about the structural properties of the world, but also allows us to 
explain some theory changes as continuous and rational. In the special case 
of space-time, a structural interpretative metaphysics can explain to us why 
we can think of GTR as at the same time substantival and deterministic; it 
also explains the practice of identifying space-time with the pair (M, g), 
generally accepted by physicists, and does not lead to inconsistency in the 
appraisal of the determinism of Newton‟s kinematics in the classical and 
the generally covariant versions.
28
 
One might have the following objection to the reasoning which I used to 
justify basic and interpretative metaphysics: if someone takes for granted 
some assumptions in her reasoning, she cannot at the same time justify 
them without falling into petitio principi. In fact, this would be a misguided 
objection. We do not deduce scientific theories from basic metaphysical 
assumptions. What we do is look in a creative way for new theories that can 
satisfy these assumptions. If we are successful, we can acknowledge these 
metaphysical assumptions as fruitful and probably true. In a similar way, 
we look for metaphysical assumptions that can help us interpret scientific 
theories, phenomena described by them, and changes in theories in a 
rational way, and if we find such assumptions, we can appreciate them as 
providing satisfactory explanation and being probably true.  
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In any case, our appraisal of assumed metaphysics is more plausible if 
we also try to apply opposite or alternative assumptions—if such trials fail, 
our evaluation is more credible. Good examples of what I am talking about 
can be found both in history of science and in recent philosophical 
discussions. Newton took it for granted that there is (ontologically) absolute 
space and time and his mechanics refers motion to their inertial structure. 
Attempts to build alternative relational theories of motion and relational 
theories of space and time on the basis of Leibniz‟s, Huygens‟, and Mach‟s 
ideas as taken up by Einstein and, more recently, by Barbour have come to 
nothing.
29
 In the case of interpretative metaphysics, the above comparison 
of structural scientific realism on the one hand, and non-structural realism 
or anti-realism on the other, seems to be an example of how different 
metaphysical assumptions can affect our assessment of the continuity and 
rationality of the development of science. 
It is interesting to note that sometimes the metaphysical statements that 
we receive as a result of the interpretation of some theory can be used as a 
metaphysical basis for a new theory. For example, J. Stachel (2005) 
proposes that the future theory of quantum gravity that we are looking for 
should satisfy the principle of maximal permutability, requiring the theory 
to be formulated in such a way that the physical results are invariant under 
all possible permutations of basic entities of the same kind. In the form of a 
metaphysical statement, this principle says that whatever the ultimate nature 
of the fundamental entities according to the quantum gravity theory turns 
out to be, they should not possess inherent individuality, because it is 
absent, according to Stachel, at the level of both general relativity and 
quantum theory.
30
  
 
3. Science, Metaphysics and Scientific Realism 
 
The scientific realism debate is a debate among different metaphysical 
views concerning the relations between scientific theories and reality; it 
concerns the problem of whether we can take scientific theories at face 
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 See Stachel (2005, p. 9). Although the proposed principle is interesting and worth 
remembering, it is hard to accept the way Stachel uses the term “haecceity”; he seems 
to use it as a term which is supposed to mean something like giving “final 
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case of points of space-time is gained only “from the properties they inherit from the 
metrical or other physical relations imposed on them” (2005, p. 57). The point is that 
haecceity is a non-qualitative property that cannot be shared by different individuals, 
which can happen in the case of a symmetrical metrical field and other symmetrical 
physical relations. 
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value, i.e., whether there are theory-independent phenomena which our 
theories talk about. In particular, it relates to the theoretical terms that 
appear in our theories and about which we cannot be sure whether they 
really refer to mind-independent entities. The anti-realist claims that 
theoretical terms and constructions are only a kind of auxiliary scaffolding 
that we can get rid of as soon as we reach predictions about observables.  
The debate concerns the problem of how we can interpret our scientific 
theories and their theoretical constructions and methods. This means—and 
this is especially striking in this debate—that we are not paying enough 
attention to the metaphysical basis of science, that is, to the realistic roots of 
science. This is convenient for the anti-realist because it is obvious that 
once we cut off these realistic roots, there appear possibilities of 
interpreting scientific theories in almost any way we want, and the 
arguments needed to grow these roots again lose much of their persuasive 
force. In such a situation, interpreting theoretical constructions in terms of 
artificial auxiliary scaffolding can seem plausible and more cautious than 
the realistic view. What follows from previous considerations and what I 
would like to maintain is that the realist should rather return the discussion 
to more familiar ground: she should insist on taking into account the 
metaphysical—that is, the realistic—basis of science. Thus, instead of 
claiming that we can explain the amazing success of science only if we 
assume realism, she should rather maintain that science is first and foremost 
aimed at the real world, trying to gain knowledge about it, including 
knowledge of both observable and unobservable phenomena, and that this 
task is being performed as well as it can be. Unobservable entities such as 
the basic components of physical objects, their properties and interactions; 
the ideal order of moving celestial bodies, which astronomers until 
Copernicus stubbornly constructed from circles and uniform motions, 
notwithstanding what they saw in the sky; numbers which we try to see 
everywhere; space-time and causal structure; the large-scale structure of 
universe and the amazing properties of the vacuum; the relations between 
space and time and physical bodies—these are the primary targets of our 
cognition, and the corresponding theoretical terms are not just artificial 
crutches or instruments for predictions. Much of our research is aimed at 
discovering structures (space-time structure, causal structure, or simply 
those that are described by our physical theories). And one of our 
fundamental metaphysical claims demands simplicity of these structures. 
I referred above to scientific practice, but I would also like to recall here 
the arguments I used previously in section (2.1): we can develop science 
only because we rely on metaphysical—i.e., realistic in my use of the 
term—conjectures about the world. I tried to show that many of the most 
important methodological values that we impose on our theories and the 
methodological rules that guide our research have their roots in statements 
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that are metaphysical in nature. We appreciate such values as, for example, 
simplicity and generality, depth, coherence, richness of content, precision 
and exactness of predictions, and intersubjective validity. And we assume 
methodological rules that require us to search for these values because we 
are convinced that the constitution of the world is simple and uniform and 
the theories that we regard as general and “deep” have a chance of revealing 
their fundamental (or deep) structure; we require coherence because we 
believe in the ontological law of contradiction, and we demand that our 
theories be intersubjectively valid because we believe that the world is 
independent of us and the same for all of us; we try to describe the world in 
numbers because we are convinced that its structure is mathematical; we 
appreciate precise and exact predictions and want to see causal relations in 
the world because we do not want to see our world as ruled by accident. In 
all these cases, our convictions, which are clearly metaphysical in nature 
(i.e., they refer to the world), become the motives or reasons behind the 
acceptance of methodological values and rules. 
At least one of these metaphysical assumptions, as I have tried to 
demonstrate, is indispensable: we have to refer to mind-independent entities 
when we want to compare or unify two different theories. There is no other 
plausible basis for the appearance in different theories of the same entities, 
such as, for example, electromagnetic waves in optics and in 
electromagnetic theory, the same entities in electrodynamics and in the 
theory of weak interactions, or the same spatiotemporal structure in 
different theories, than the actual existence of these entities, together with 
their properties, in the world. The anti-realist view cannot provide us with a 
plausible basis for, or an explanation of, the entities we should identify; it 
cannot give us any foundation for our claim that some entities, such as the 
above-mentioned space-time structure in different theories (for example, in 
Maxwell‟s theory and in mechanics), not only can have the same 
properties, but that they must have them. 
It should be emphasized that the argument formulated above is not 
simply a new version of the no-miracles argument.
31
 I do not claim simply 
that the success of science would be inexplicable if scientific theories were 
not at least an approximately true description of the world. I rather try to 
show, by analyzing basic and not interpretative metaphysics, that science in 
its deepest foundations refers to the real world and that this is a necessary 
condition for its development.  
Of course, I do not claim that the above considerations can prove (in the 
sense in which we use this term in mathematics) the claims of the scientific 
realist. What I claim is that science tries to refer to the world (to both 
observable and unobservable entities that make it up) or, in other words, 
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that science relies on metaphysical claims, and that scientific realism is a 
metaphysical position that describes and develops this scientific interest in 
the real world from a philosophical point of view. Although metaphysics 
aspires to say something about the world, we as humans are unable to look 
at this world from the point of view of God and say simply that this 
metaphysics is certainly true or false; we rather assume that metaphysical 
views consist of hypothetical claims that are justified by their fruitfulness 
and explanatory worth for science and for our knowledge in general, and—
as I have tried to show—scientific realism best satisfies both of these 
criteria. The contrary view, although it can be vindicated as one of the 
possible interpretations of scientific theories, completely fails when we try 
to make use of it to understand the realistic attitude of science. In the anti-
realist‟s claims, which are highly theoretical and by no means instrumental 
or intended to be any kind of auxiliary scaffolding, the authors are forced to 
treat the realistic attitude of scientists toward unobservable entities and 
structures as merely a kind of illusion. The true merit of anti-realism 
consists rather in the fact that it is a valuable source of criticism for 
scientific realism, making it possible to see some of the latter‟s weaknesses 
and enabling us to improve our understanding of the relations between 
scientific theories and the world.  
 
4. Final Remarks 
 
Science is developing through an ongoing dialogue with metaphysics. In 
this dialogue, metaphysics alternately changes its role from a cautious guide 
to a careful interpreter, while at all times remaining open to critical remarks 
from the other side. Its role consists in formulating general ideas—
primarily about the world, with us as part of it, and secondarily about our 
knowledge of it. Science can then develop and verify these ideas. Both 
sides of this dialogue need each other because giving up this dialogical 
relation would lead to the ossification of our knowledge. 
Both science and metaphysics are aimed at the real world, both work 
toward gaining knowledge about it. Unobservable entities, such as the 
elementary components and physical structures of the world, have not 
been—from ancient Greece until now—just an ordinary part of our 
research, they need to be the principal target of it. The mistakes that we 
make in both metaphysics and science should not discourage us from 
looking for the truth, but should rather encourage us to be more critical and 
more cautious. 
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